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Alice *at*
June *J*
Kitty
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DGR file

✓ *and*
Honorable Craig Hosmer
House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Craig:

Thank you for your note of 17 February with which you enclosed copies of your letter to the President and your study on "Organization For Cold War." As you indicate, it does have implications for CIA and I shall study it carefully.

Your thoughtfulness in sending me your study and related material is appreciated.

Sincerely,

(Signed) JOHN A. MCCONE

John A. McCone
Director

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
✓ 1 - DCI w/basic
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1 - ER
1 - IG
1 - Leg. Counsel

OGC/LC/GLC:jmd (26 Feb 62)

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FILE

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Executive Order
62-1030

C-O-P-Y

February 16, 1962

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing copies of my study on "Organization for Cold War."

This document points up the vital need for better organization for cold war, urges your immediate attention to the matter, and specifically urges you to take the following steps without delay:

1. Establish a Strategic and Tactical Office of the Presidency on the lines of a permanent cold war task force; and,
2. Establish a Command Control Information Center to monitor continuously cold war operations of ourselves, our allies and the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Full details regarding these proposals are contained in the study. It is furnished you, personally, because you are the only official of the United States government possessing the broad power needed to establish these necessary management tools for successful prosecution of the non-military conflict thrust upon us by the international communist conspiracy.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ Craig Hosmer

CRAIG HOSMER, M.C.

Encs.

Note to Correspondents: (1) These documents for release: NOON - E.S.T.
Monday
February 19, 1962

(2) The study also will be the basis for a speech in the House of Representatives by the author on Feb. 19th.

ORGANIZATION FOR COLD WAR

by

Rep. Craig Hosmer of California

If Secretary Robert F. McNamara is running the United States' hot war effort, who is running our cold war effort?

The question is unanswerable simply because the United States has no real cold war organization for anybody to run.

The global struggle between our way of life and communism can range in intensity from dropping thermonuclear bombs to dropping propaganda pamphlets. Its major segments in decreasing order of intensity are general war, limited war, sub-limited war and cold war.

U.S. national strategy has been to deter Sino-Soviet leaders from general and limited war. Our magnificently organized military establishment consistently has implemented that strategy by maintaining such an overwhelming military retaliatory capability that communist leaders have not been free to initiate general war nor successfully to pursue limited war.

As a consequence they have waged sub-limited war and cold war with intense ferocity.

Sub-limited war is exemplified by the strife existing in Vietnam today. Whether consisting of guerilla action, rioting, other forms of civil disturbance or the revolutionary means by which Castro siezed Cuba, sub-limited war is no more than communist military action by proxy -- inside the borders of a victim country, carried on largely by that country's own citizens, with arms, munitions, organizational support and ideological goals supplied by the international communist conspiracy.

Meeting the sub-limited war threat is largely a military and intelligence task. For long we neglected it. Recent organizational and functional changes in United States military operations in Vietnam evidence serious attention now is being devoted to neutralizing communist sub-limited war efforts.

Success here will lead to further intensification of cold war, communism's last remaining battleground. The blunt truth is that as yet we remain woefully unprepared to contest communism successfully on the cold war battleground. The communist still continue making substantial cold war gains which reduce our influence and bring our prestige into question in various parts of the world.

The basic method for fighting any war, including cold war, is to (1) formulate sound objectives, (2) develop supporting strategies and tactics and, (3) create, man and support the organization required for their attainment.

The problem of properly organizing our cold war effort as a major enterprise on a scale for victory can no longer be neglected in public discussion. The fact that Americans, long noted for organizational talents and suffering serious cold war setbacks for over a decade and a half, have not effectively tackled this problem to date must be a matter of considerable surprise even to the Kremlin.

-2-

Past ineffectual efforts toward this end are evidenced by several reorganizations of the national security machinery of the Executive Branch. The National Security Council was established in 1947. Its composition and advisory status are well known. Its duty is to assess national objectives, commitments and risks, and make recommendations to the President. The President alone has the broad power and authority required to initiate, integrate and coordinate all the many activities which together fix the nation's cold war posture. Once a Presidential decision on a given policy has been made in this area, it is transmitted to the various departments and agencies for action.

In an attempt to coordinate operational planning of these various governmental units, the Operations Coordinating Board was established within the National Security Council structure. Although it had the virtue of producing inter-agency government plans to implement policy, it was ineffective to carry them out because it lacked authority to penetrate the many layers of government bureaucracy blocking quick and coordinated action. As a result the Operations Coordinating Board was abolished.

Shortly after assuming office President Kennedy indicated his plans to carry out personally what the Board had failed to accomplish. He indicated he would maintain direct communication with the departments and agencies and keep himself well informed on actions taken to carry out decisions. To assist and advise him in this endeavor he selected a small group of individuals headed by his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy.

The dismal failure of the Cuban invasion at Bay of Pigs is but one example of the inadequacy of this latest attempt at cold war organization. The President simply does not have the time to run the cold war effort daily with personal attention and his advisory group does not have the authority to do so. In addition, the set-up fails to provide comprehensive, up-to-the-minute intelligence, communications, briefings and analyses on which effective cold war command decisions must rely.

Perhaps the failure of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower to establish an adequate cold war organization is understandable. They were products of a pre-cold war time and political environment which accepted peace and war as well defined and meaningful alternative conditions of international life.

In contrast, Mr. Kennedy has come to political maturity in an era during which our world has been characterized by desperate struggles between nations in the shadowy, grey areas of cold war. In his 1961 State of the Union Message he evidenced an appreciation of the necessity to operate successfully in these areas by saying, "...before my term has ended, we shall have to test anew whether a nation organized and governed such as ours can endure..."

Yet, over a year later, notwithstanding several routine organizational efforts, including recommendation of a Department for Urban Affairs, Mr. Kennedy has still to come to grips with the vital problem of workable organization for cold war.

It is not an insoluble problem even though it involves putting together into one task force the foreign affairs activities of more than a score of separate departments and agencies. The task force concept is ideal for cold war purposes. It can bring together the cold war operations of otherwise unrelated governmental units under coordinated, efficient, integrated operational control. Further, it permits them all an opportunity to contribute to long and medium range planning and take part in flexible response/unanticipated opportunities.

Inherent in the task force concept must be mechanics to insure that our cold war effort has balance, consistency and completeness (1) in the overall sense, (2) country by country, and (3) in the time dimensions: present, short range and long range.

Specifically it is recommended that the President act quickly to achieve the following cold war organizational objectives:

1. Establish a Strategic and Tactical Office of the Presidency (STOP) on the lines of a permanent cold war task force which will function to define our national cold war objectives, devise a series of operation plans for major functional and geographic areas according to sound strategy and tactics, and, under the President's authority direct cold war operations pursuant thereto.
2. Establish a Command Control Information Center (CCIC) within the structure of STOP to assist in the continuing daily review and direction of cold war operations.

Strategic and Tactical Office of the Presidency: Headed by the Vice-President of the United States to give it maximum executive authority, this task force should consist of highly qualified and responsible representatives from the Under Secretary and Agency Administrator levels of the major functional areas of cold war interest: political, economic, informational, cultural, scientific, military affairs and the like. STOP's hard core operating units might include, but need not be limited to the following:

- a. Chief, Political Affairs (Under Secretary of State): Diplomatic Activity (State); Domestic Information Releases (White House Press); International Labor Activity (Labor); Foreign Liaison (State/CIA/USIA/FBI).
- b. Chief, Economic Affairs (Treasury Under Secretary): Financial Operations (Treasury/State/AID/Defense); Commercial Operations (Commerce/Labor/Agriculture); Agricultural Operations (Agriculture/Commerce/AID).
- c. Chief, Information Affairs (Administrator, USIA): Overseas Psychological Operations (USIA/CIA/Peace Corps); Scientific Operations (NASA/AEC/Nat.Sci.Foundation/USIA).
- d. Chief, Cultural Affairs (Assistant Secretary of State): Cultural Operations (State/USIA/AID/HEW); Ideological Positions (Cabinet/USIA/White House Press).
- e. Chief, Military Affairs (Under Secretary of Defense): Military Posture (Defense/Joint Chiefs); Cold War Posture (Special Evaluation Panel/CCIC); Secret Operation, Cover & Deception (Defense/CIA).

Additionally, STOP's effective functioning would require a small but skilled permanent staff which might be directed by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. The staff's function would be to assist in long range planning, perform daily routine supervision tasks, help dissipate bureaucratic inertia and aid the President and other national leaders to communicate clearly and forcefully our national cold war objectives and policies at home and abroad to people on both sides of the Iron Curtain whose beliefs and aspirations coincide with our own.

Command Control Information Center: The permanent staff also would operate the Command Control Information Center serving as a central facility to monitor world-wide activities for both long and medium range planning and day-to-day operations.

Information pertaining to our own cold war activities, those of our allies and of the Sino-Soviet bloc would be displayed concisely and currently for easy assimilation. The CCIC would analyze and evaluate progress of the cold war on a continuous basis and constantly monitor the success of our programs. It might be particularly valuable in spotting opportunities for quick, responsive actions to forward U.S. interests as they unexpectedly develop.

Information gathered and evaluated by CCIC well might be transmitted by closed circuit television and teleprinter systems so senior representatives of departments and agencies can be briefed, issue and receive information and monitor daily activities without physically visiting the Center. It is estimated that approximately 80 specialists will be required to man Command Control Information Center on an around-the-clock schedule. The most modern communications, display and briefing equipment should be furnished CCIC.

The organization and procedures discussed here are intended only as a broad, skeleton outline of the management organization tools which are missing and must be supplied if the gaps and deficiencies in United States cold war efforts are to be closed.

Just as the President alone has the broad power and control of activities necessary for cold war operations, so does he alone have the power to initiate the organization here suggested as fundamentally required to exercise that power and control effectively. He should act promptly and decisively.

The time in which he has to act grows shorter and shorter. Continued weakness in our cold war posture can only result in a progressive deterioration of our military posture. The ignominious defeat suffered by France in World War II sprang from her concentration on Maginot Line defenses. The Germans ignored them with a by-pass move through the Low Countries. Similarly, in the struggle with communism we cannot safely concentrate only on its military aspects and our hot war defenses, leaving our cold war ramparts essentially disorganized and inadequately guarded. -30-

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PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 87th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Anatomy of the Cold War

SPEECH

OF

HON. CRAIG HOSMER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 7, 1961

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, America's awakening to the vital challenge thrust upon us by the international Communist conspiracy is one of the most significant and encouraging events of our time. But merely to be awakened to the danger is one thing. Handling it intelligently and effectively is another.

This requires a broad general understanding of who we are up against and what we are up against. It requires the relinquishment of many outdated concepts no longer applicable to the world situation today. It demands original, hard thinking to replace them with concepts that are realistic in relation to facts as they brutally are, not as we might wishfully think them to be.

For instance, we must accept the concept of a bipolar world in which the U.S.S.R. and the United States represent the poles. No longer is the world the "family of nations" conceived by late 19th and early 20th century political thinking. Nor do the so-called uncommitted nations of today possess power of sufficient strength, moral or physical, to sway these poles.

We must regard the international Communist conspiracy which opposes us as first, the force described by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, plus second, all the considerable human and physical resources enslaved behind the Iron Curtain. The two are, in fact, in combination.

This discussion seeks to define and analyze only some of the background involved, only some of the strategy and tactics applicable, and only a few of the cold war techniques utilized to advance Communist objectives. Necessarily only a few, because altogether they are as vast as the problem itself. Hot war also is discussed. Necessarily because hot war and cold war are interrelated parts of the total conflict in which we find ourselves.

COMMUNISM'S GOAL: WORLD DOMINATION

The resolve of Soviet Communist leaders to extend their domination world-wide—with Moscow as the seat of ad-

thority—has remained unshaken for over four decades. There were periods when it was expedient for them not to press this determination because of some more urgent problem, as in World War II. But once they have dealt with a crisis, the Soviets waste no time in renewing their attack. There is current evidence of a desire by Chinese Communists to play a larger role in directing communism's expansion. Their leverage is growing as witnessed by the Communist bloc's intense ideological struggle over the peaceful coexistence policy. But, and though this may not always be the case, it is still Moscow, not Peiping, against which the West principally must calculate its dangers and erect its military and nonmilitary defenses to thwart the master plan to install a Communist government in every nation on earth, with all looking to Moscow for guidance.

COMMUNIST STRATEGY: TOTAL CONFLICT

Toward achieving its ends, Communist dogma dictates utilization of any means which are expedient, as long as the Soviet revolutionary base is not endangered. Military force is one instrument for carrying out this policy, and the Communists are inhibited by no moral restrictions from using it to gain their ends. To them, the important factor is that inadmissible risks must not be undertaken. To do so would constitute adventurism, a serious deviation from Communist ideology.

At the same time, if within the limits of the risks which Soviet leaders deemed wise to take, an opportunity presented itself to strike the United States a blow which would remove it as the chief obstacle to the Soviet goal, Soviet leaders would consider it a sin just as serious as the other deviation not to take advantage of the opportunity.

In short, Communist doctrine places on Communist leaders a constant responsibility to proceed by the most expeditious means possible and these may range from dropping pamphlets to dropping thermonuclear bombs. The degree of violence to be selected is that which can gain the most advantage with the least proportionate cost under the particular circumstances existing at the time of decision.

THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Thusly Communists fight toward their goal all the time over a spectrum of conflict which can span the full scope of

human activities—from sports competition to thermonuclear war. They have no set time schedule for bringing this conflict to a successful conclusion. The Communists are patient, willing to accept temporary setbacks if necessary. They conceive the conflict as a protracted one and their patience in waging it is based on a confidence in the ultimate victory promised by Marxist-Leninist doctrines.

It is obvious that the spectrum of conflict divides itself into two major segments according to degrees of violence: military war and nonmilitary war—hot war and cold war. In turn, each segment resolves itself into sectors based on the same patterns of intensity.

Cold war in its present stylized spectrum ranges from scientific demonstrations, such as space efforts, propaganda, and economic competition, to military-political-humanitarian foreign aid, to presence of forces, as in East Germany, to threats of force, such as Khrushchev's talk of 100-megaton nuclear bombs, to assistance to engaged allies, as was given to Red China in the Korean war. In the same style hot war ranges from police action, to limited war, to graduated retaliation to unrestricted war. In a gray area between hot war and cold war fall such modern-day instruments of aggression as rioting, border incidents, and guerrilla warfare.

Fundamental to U.S. survival is, first recognizing we are engaged in this total, protracted conflict; and second, developing an irrevocable determination to win it. But that is only the beginning. We must organize ourselves to fight it as a major enterprise, on a scale for victory, with all the physical and moral resources at our command. We must never forget that the weapons employed against us are varied and limitless. Subversion, spying, sabotage, and diplomatic perfidy are but a few illustrations. We cannot concentrate exclusively on defending against just some of the weapons of Communist attack, leaving the ramparts ungarded elsewhere. We are faced with total conflict and we must fight that conflict in all its totality—on all the cold war fronts at all times, on all the hot war fronts if ever we must.

Moreover, we can never expect victory if we fight only defensively. We must take the initiative, bring the fight to the enemy's own home base in cold war just as we are prepared to do in hot war. Doing this involves risks and it in-

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WHAT WILL DETER THE SOVIETS?

volves escalating up the scale of violence whenever required. The risks so involved must always be calculated against the risks of not taking action of sufficient intensity to achieve our purposes. Often timidity is more risky, in the end, than boldness. In any event, our enemy must be convinced we treasure our freedom, our way of life, and our country sufficiently to take the degree of action necessary for preserving them. Otherwise he is left free to achieve his ends via the piecemeal surrender route of bluff, bluster, and blackmail.

DETERRING HOT WAR

The willingness and ability to fight the hottest kind of war, if survival depends upon it, feeds back into considerations regarding the taking of all kinds of actions less in degree of violence. This is because the hottest kind of war is the reference point from which decisions are calculated for the taking of all lesser military and nonmilitary actions in relations between nations.

During the Lebanon crisis the landing of U.S. Marines and presence of U.S. Naval Forces evidenced a U.S. determination and willingness to fight, if necessary, to keep the Communists from taking over this part of the world. The Soviets, in face of this clear evidence of intention to resist piecemeal surrender, backed away. Put another way, they were deterred from pursuing the course of aggression in this area they had embarked upon. Had we not taken the risk of displaying this show of power, they could have achieved supremacy in the Mideast. The consequence of that would be to put us in a situation far more risky than proceeding as we did. By way of contrast, we failed to provide air cover for the Cuban invasion in the spring of 1961 even though the risk involved was small. As a consequence, Castro achieved even greater power over Cuba and the resulting situation is more risky than before.

The same principles apply to deterring Communist leaders from attempting to achieve their goals by starting all-out nuclear war and attacking the United States. Our deterrent system must plainly be capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the enemy. If he believes we will use it for that purpose if he does attack, he will be deterred from doing so.

The very success of a system deterring all out nuclear war makes more likely the resort to lesser violence in the form of limited war and intensified cold war. Thus skeletonizing limited war conventional land, sea and air capability by overexpenditure on deterrence cannot be tolerated.

Neither can the important third front, nonmilitary warfare, be neglected if our overall defense posture is to succeed in thwarting Communist ambitions. We can freeze to death in cold war as easily as we can burn to death in a hot war.

In any event, the cost of creating and maintaining a deterrent force is extremely high. For the sake of our national economic health it is important that money is not spent unnecessarily in this direction.

Determining what will deter the Soviets can be learned from the answer to another question: How much destruction to their homeland are Soviet leaders prepared to risk in order to achieve their ultimate goal if cold war methods do not succeed or, in their opinion, they are too slow?

Obviously, only the Soviet leaders themselves can answer that question. It is doubtful if even they have arrived at it precisely. It is likely that within limits the answer will vary from time to time because of the Communist doctrine holding that whatever is dictated by historical circumstances is true party line at any particular moment and shall be implemented.

It is clear that Soviet leaders, if it can be avoided, have no desire to become involved in nuclear war, either growing out of surprise attack or by escalation of limited war. Khrushchev often refers to the deadliness and horror of general nuclear war in his speeches. A leading Soviet military analyst, Maj. Gen. Nicolai A. Talensky, recently wrote a widely publicized article pointing out the futility of resorting to nuclear war to decide political controversies.

How accurately such expressions reflect Soviet military philosophy and how much they reflect the long standing Soviet propaganda campaign aimed at nuclear disarmament of the West cannot, of course, be determined. It would be dangerous error, in any event, to assume Soviet leaders would not make a sudden massive attack against the United States if their calculation of relative strength convinced them it could be done without serious risk of disaster to the Soviet revolutionary base.

Such a situation could arise if the relative balance between forces suddenly tipped in the Soviet's favor through some scientific or technological breakthrough. It could arise should the United States allow its deterrent system to deteriorate badly. It could arise if the U.S. position became so weakened by repeated cold war and limited war defeats that retaliation would be made quixotic and unbelievable. Our only security against surprise nuclear attack is balanced strength, which includes a retaliatory capacity so swift, so certain and so deadly it rules out the possibility. How deadly?

WHAT PUNISHMENT WILL SOVIETS ACCEPT?

One way of arriving at some understanding of how much destruction Soviet leaders might be willing to exchange for gaining their objective is by making historical comparisons. For one thing, the standard of living is substantially higher in the United States than in the Soviet Union, and the farther a civilization progresses from its primitive beginnings, the more value is placed on human life. Also, the continental United States has enjoyed nearly a century of stable government without suffering the consequences of invasion or attack by outside military forces. During this period the Russians have had a very violent nationwide revolution and civil war and have experienced extensive de-

struction of life and property during two world wars, as well as a costly and humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. What would deter them is not necessarily what would deter us.

Another factor which has bearing on our question is Soviet civil defense. Until late 1953, the Soviets made no preparation for civil defense in a nuclear war. Today their effort is the most extensive to be found anywhere in the world. The effort which the Soviet government has made in this direction indicates it takes a realistic attitude toward the possibility of Soviet participation in a general nuclear war. However, its objective should not be misconceived. There is no evidence of a newly acquired benevolence toward human life amongst Kremlin bosses greater than amongst western leaders in the ratio of Soviet to western civil defense efforts. A characteristic of communism is callousness toward human life. Primary interest is not in saving human lives per se, but in preserving the skills, so important to Soviet industry and strength, represented by them.

Nevertheless, assuming reasonable effectiveness of the civil defense program, the result is this: If concurrently with a Soviet first strike, 80 percent of the 50 million people in the largest 160 Soviet population centers are evacuated to non-target areas with reasonable fallout protection, casualties from nuclear retaliation would be cut from 50 million to 10 million—a factor of five.

Ten million lives is a large number, but, in U.S.S.R. experience, by no means a prohibitive or even a crippling price to pay to achieve important objectives. A study made in 1959 by Prof. Warren W. Eason of Princeton concluded that the Soviet Union suffered 25 million World War II casualties, about 13 percent of total population. This followed the purges of the 1920's and 1930's which accounted, by some estimates, for almost another 25 million deaths.

Physical damage of all kinds from Nazi military operations also was massive. In addition to nonindustrial losses, the official Soviet historical review of World War II estimates 40 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s industrial capacity was totally destroyed, a figure generally accepted by Western students of the war's consequences.

Despite these huge losses of life and the enormous damage inflicted on the Soviet economy, the rate of production in the U.S.S.R. by 1950 was greater than at any time in its history. Even granting some increase on the value placed on human life by reason of improved living standards, it seems reasonable to assume that Soviet Communist leaders would accept punishment at least equivalent to World War II in exchange for eliminating the United States as a checkmate to their goal.

WHAT PUNISHMENT MUST UNITED STATES BE ABLE TO INFLICT?

Here then, is an absolute minimum limit for U.S. deterrent capability: A second strike ability to inflict damage equivalent to the combined effect of erasing 14 percent of the Soviet Union's

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population and 41 percent of its industrial capacity.

That these are damage equivalent figures and not the outline for a targeting pattern must be understood. Aside from the moral questions involved in threatening death to such large numbers of people, over 29 million in a population of some 209 million, the combination of civil defense and natural dispersal over 8½ million square miles of territory make attempting it utterly impractical.

For this reason a deterrent system targeted against population would not be believable and would fail to deter. Further, even if it were practical to carry out a death threat against 14 percent of Soviet citizens, there is no good reason to believe Soviet leaders would not willingly trade that many—or 15 or 20 or 50 percent or even more—if the deal guaranteed them world supremacy. Equally clear is the physical futility of basing deterrence on a major threat to the agricultural economy of this vast land stretching across two continents.

All this by no means implies that within the limits of peacetime budgets a steady, stable deterrent to Soviet button-pushers cannot be achieved. In the final analysis what Soviet leaders fear most is impairment of the means by which they seek to accomplish the Communist goal of world domination. Their principal instrumentalities for exercising power on the international scale are first, the Soviet military establishment, and second, the Soviet industrial economy. Consequently, a positive U.S. second strike capability targeted at crippling these to an unacceptable degree will effectively deter. Moreover, these are the targets within the U.S.S.R. particularly vulnerable to nuclear impairment by the present and projected combinations of manned aircraft and missile weapons systems making up U.S. strategic forces.

U.S. RETALIATORY CAPABILITY EFFECTIVELY DETERS

U.S. capability obviously goes far above that percentage. This is because an adequate, flexible transportation system is essential to any nation seeking to exercise the role of a major world power. It is a prerequisite for effective utilization of military forces and vital to bring in raw materials, supply power, and move out the finished goods of an influential industrial society.

The Soviet transportation system is characterized by an especially heavy reliance on railroads, 85 percent of all tonnage, compared to 50 percent for the United States. About 10 percent is moved on inland waterways and the remaining 5 percent by highways, pipelines, coastal shipping, and air transport combined. The estimated number of major centers fed by the national rail network is 160. Only 160 nuclear knock-out blows need be pressed home against this rail system at freely chosen, less defended locations to fragmentize the U.S.S.R.'s interdependent society into as many cutoff and isolated segments.

It is clear that U.S. strategic forces are fully capable of deterring Soviet leaders from initiating nuclear war. We possess the determination to strike back without hesitation and the

capability of destroying that which they know they cannot afford to lose. The real question is how much more deterrent capability are we buying than we really need?

DETERRED FROM HOT WAR, SOVIETS WAGE COLD WAR

Thus, deterred from quick explosive victory, the Soviets and their allies in international communism have turned to measures short of all-out nuclear war to advance toward communism's goal. While carrying on a general nonmilitary offensive against the free world—aimed at weakening its physical ability as well as destroying its will to resist—on a geographical basis they are employing a three-prong strategy calculated to segment the free world and isolate its parts.

The prongs are thrusting:

First. Over the pole through Iceland and down the Atlantic—to be aided by the large submarine fleet—for the purpose of cutting off Europe from North America;

Second. Down from the soft underbelly, through the Mideast, into Africa and spanning the Atlantic to Cuba—to sever North from South America and Europe from the Far East; and

Third. Out from Communist China through Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, the Malay Peninsula, and hopefully turning the corner and proceeding up the Philippines and Japan—to cut off the Americas from the Far East and isolate India and Australasia.

The importance which Communist leaders attach to securing these geographical areas is evidenced by their willingness to escalate considerably up the scale of violence where they are concerned. Limited war by proxy in Korea, guerrilla fighting in Laos, the revolution in Cuba, civil disorders in Iraq, the Congo, and elsewhere, are examples.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Peaceful coexistence is what Khrushchev chooses to call this present state of affairs. We call it cold war or non-military war. Khrushchev says it is merely a form of intense economic, political, and ideological struggle between the socialist camp and what he calls the aggressive forces of imperialism. This, he says, is a better way of achieving world communism than war. But what he means is that today it better advances the Communist cause to proceed by non-military warfare than it does by military warfare—tomorrow it may be different, if tomorrow's circumstances are different. Even under today's circumstances peaceful coexistence as waged by the Soviets must be understood as neither peaceful nor aimed at coexisting for one instant longer than necessary.

Except for all-out war between major powers, in the final analysis, it amounts to a no-holds-barred conflict for world domination played under Soviet ground rules.

One of these rules is that the world is divided into the peace zone—Communist territory—and the war zone—non-Communist territory. And the contest shall be carried on entirely in the war zone. Another is that all action to forward the

Communist cause is just and any action to resist it is unjust. Thus, subversion and sabotage of free world institutions are Communist instruments of peaceful coexistence and revolts such as in Algeria and Latin America are encouraged under the guise of national liberation movements. These are deemed just acts and just wars, to be fully supported by the Kremlin.

Recent successes lend weight to Moscow's contention that their current policy is, indeed, a presently effective substitution of political-economic-psychological warfare for military force.

THE BERLIN CRISIS

The current Berlin crisis is a classic example of Communist strategy and tactics in waging cold war to gain their objectives. For months Khrushchev's truculent belligerency built up tensions over Berlin. Fear was fed on fear. Then with dramatic ruthlessness he torpedoed the Geneva A-test-ban talks and announced Soviet test resumption. He coupled this with terror talk of 100 million million ton K-bombs—K for Khrushchev. All aimed at creating worldwide hysterical fear in hopes of euehring concessions which will give him control of Berlin as a step toward control of Germany as a step toward control of all Europe.

Why the Kremlin plays this bold game of nuclear blackmail is simple. It has little to do with Communist ideological abstractions and our resistance to it has little to do with democratic idealism. It is because Berlin is the political key. West Germany is the industrial lock. And West Europe is the economic gate to the world.

To control the world by force requires a superior economic-industrial base in support of arms. To control the world by economic domination requires a superior economic-industrial base in support of an unflinching flow of capital goods and trade. By 1970 the estimated value of all goods and services, gross national product, and thus the most comprehensive measure of productive activity will be:

	Billions
West Europe.....	\$800
United States.....	740
Soviet bloc.....	630
Underdeveloped nations.....	300

The Soviet Union now knows it cannot surpass West Europe and the United States in the industrial capacity needed to support an arms race or a protracted armed conflict.

The Soviet Union now knows it cannot, even by the most stringent denial—industrial growth without public consumption—match the combined economic resources of the United States and West Europe.

But the Soviet Union knows that with the industrial plant, economic resources, scientists and technicians of West Germany and West Europe it can control the world.

These are the stakes in the Berlin crisis. These are the reasons why Mr. Khrushchev intensifies the cold war to the hilt and threatens a nuclear holocaust. They are also the reasons why he will not go beyond the brink and start a

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nuclear holocaust. If he does all Europe's industrial capacity will be reduced to ashes. There will be no \$800 billion gross national product of Europe to strengthen his empire. He must obtain these assets undamaged, in running order and with the people to run them. If we but keep our cold war wits and act accordingly, the crisis of Berlin can be passed without loss and without damage. Mr. Khrushchev will be relegated to another way and another day to seek his objectives.

COLD WAR

Unfortunately these cold war wits of ours I have mentioned are, at this point, neither sharp nor plentiful. Our enemy has 40 years leadtime in knowhow and experience in fighting cold war. There are many things we must do and do quickly, not only to surmount the crisis of Berlin, but other crises to come again and again in the future from aggressive actions by our relentless challenger.

I have mentioned that we must actually recognize we are now engaged in a conflict in which the stakes are freedom and national existence itself. This, the cold war, need not necessarily be a mere preliminary bout to a hotter main event. It could well be the main event itself and the loser will have no second chance. I have mentioned that we must develop an irrevocable determination to win this contest. Having developed it, we must broadcast that determination to the world and enlist the help of all men everywhere who cherish freedom in this great battle for its survival.

Americans are not unique in their desire for freedom, only in their vast power which causes people throughout the world to look to the United States for leadership in the contest to preserve it. These people, too, want to fight effectively in the common cause. They, too, have their worries, their doubts, their fears that the time of freedom is running short. But until the United States moves, and moves decisively, as a world leader should, others cannot be expected to go it alone in these battles.

As such a call to nonmilitary arms I recently introduced House Joint Resolution 517. It is patterned after the declaration of war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but declares conflict rather than war. It states that the international Communist conspiracy has committed repeated acts of nonmilitary aggression against us and our allies, formally declares the state of nonmilitary conflict thus thrust upon us, authorizes the President to employ the entire power of the United States to carry on nonmilitary conflict, concluding: "and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States."

There are several important considerations that are often overlooked in discussing cold war and how to wage it that I now propose to touch upon.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE ENEMY

We must clearly identify the enemy. There are two U.S.S.R.'s. Only one is the enemy. U.S.S.R. B is the people, the

country and its resources. It is not our enemy. Country B is the poor country, the horsemeat country, which sometimes cannot even supply its capital city with food and fuel. Our enemy is U.S.S.R. A, the international Communist conspiracy of an elite few who have enslaved country B and extort from it the wherewithal to present the illusion of a large and powerful society and the false image of a new system to better mankind's lot.

In reality, country A is no stronger than country B. This we must understand ourselves. And to the people of U.S.S.R. B, China B and all the other B countries—the captive nations—we must drive home that they have friends outside the Iron Curtain who seek to share with them their freedom.

WHOLE THINKING

As a people we tend to cling to a kind of fragmented thought process in international affairs which categorizes peace and war into two separable states, which, in fact, no longer exist. We live in a world which is neither at war in the classic definition of the word or at peace. It is in conflict—a new and deadly kind of conflict—and we must think in terms of its totality and the wide spectrum of actions over which it is being fought. The Reds do not make this mistake. They are realistic, if nothing else. Their thinking is as total and integrated as their objectives are clear and precise.

CRITERION FOR SACRIFICE AND EXPENDITURE

There is, however, apparent from this fiasco one absolute criterion about which there can be no argument—only understanding—which, again, it appears that the Reds possess and we do not.

It is, simply: the efficacy with which a particular action will implement a nation's external objective should determine the amount of money and manpower to be expended upon it—not the irrelevant consideration of whether the action is being taken in time of "war" or time of "peace."

Our country will accept every sacrifice in resources, men and money when it comes to fighting a war; but because of our fragmented thinking and naive misconceptions about the implementation of our external objectives, we irrationally tend toward the opposite extreme when there is no shooting going on.

This kind of inflexibility is not characteristic of the Kremlin. Not only in expenditure, but right down to Khrushchev's alternating smiles and frowns to probe our weaknesses, there is exhibited a quick effective flexibility. This, notwithstanding our fervent eagerness to accept a monolithic concept of the operations of the Communist apparatus.

We must learn that what will be achieved, not whether it is achieved during hot war or cold war, is the true standard for our efforts and sacrifice during the protracted conflict.

COMMUNIST AND FREE WORLD OBJECTIVES COMPARED

Now it becomes logical to examine what is to be achieved, and to compare the external objectives of the Communist world and our own. Perhaps real understanding of the contrasts here is

as important as anything else toward achieving understanding of what we are against and how to go about combating it.

In briefest form, these objectives can be summarized this way: Ours, peace and friendship in freedom; theirs, peace and friendship in communism.

Only a word of difference—but they are poles apart. One states a positive objective, the other a negative one. One states an indefinable objective, the other a definable one.

Since Karl Marx first put pen to paper, double meanings for stock words and phrases have been standard tools in Communist dialectic. I have purposely stated these objectives in these double meaning words to reemphasize the tricky business of Red rhetoric of which we must beware.

Peace has come to mean, rather than a state of tranquillity amongst nations, a misty goal as legendary as the Seven Cities of Cibola. In terms of relationships between nations, friendship hardly can be recognized as meaning what the dictionary describes as a "mutual regard cherished by kindred minds."

When Nikita Khrushchev came to this country in 1959 seeking "peace and friendship" he blew up a considerable storm on this "sea of semantic disorder." Freely translated, this is what he meant when he talked of seeking "peace and friendship" with the United States:

I seek a Communist United States of America. Our dogma says capitalism breeds wars. Tear up your capitalistic Constitution, turn Communist, and we'll have peace. One doesn't oppose his friend's desire. We desire to rule the world. Be friendly—stop bucking us.

On another occasion the Red dictator summed up communist objectives more bluntly and less dialectically in the phrase: "We will bury you."

That is a clearly stated and certain objective, if ever there was one. The clarity with which it can be stated is of obvious value in the day-to-day, week-to-week, month-to-month, year-to-year selection of techniques and actions to implement it.

MORALITIES

Further, Communist rationale places no moral restrictions whatsoever on their selection of these techniques and actions. Starting with the premise that capitalism breeds wars and thus must be rooted out and destroyed to achieve peace—anything, however immoral in and of itself, when used to this end is moral. Lying, cheating, betrayal, murder—the entire list of perfidies—are thus approved weapons in the Communist arsenal, to be used freely whenever, wherever, and however they will implement its objectives.

By way of contrast, our own external objectives basically represent attainment for all mankind of those enlightened precepts of morality, freedom, dignity of the individual, inherent human rights, and so on that can hardly be defined other than as: "The best and highest values which Western civilization have to offer."

Because of the inherently nebulous nature of our objectives, they are in-

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capable of precise definition. As a consequence, selection of techniques and actions to implement them can never be accomplished with calculated precision.

And, because of the moral characteristics of these objectives, we are limited in selecting means to implement them which in and of themselves fall within the range of Western civilization's standards for individual and national morality.

The advantage of precise objectives and unlimited choice in means in achieving them is great.

NEGATIVISM

Nor can the advantages of conducting a negative campaign be underestimated. It is always easier to criticize, tear down, and destroy than it is to accomplish constructive action. Watch the way the prosperity issue is handled in political campaigns—it is not so much a positive promise of a chicken in every pot as it is a negative warning of "no chicken in the pot if you elect the other fellow instead of me." Millions of dollars of a certain toothpaste have been sold not on the merits of the product, but upon the demerits of having bad breath. The slogan about "a thinking man's cigarette" is not a positive appeal to the intellectuals—there are too few of them for a mass market—it is a negative warning not to be tagged as stupid for dragging out somebody else's brand.

In short, the contrast between the Communist and the free worlds in terms of objectives and techniques and actions to implement them is simply this:

Communism: Clearly defined negative objective. No restriction on techniques and actions for implementation.

Free world: Nebulously defined positive objective. Restrictions on techniques and actions for implementation.

Understanding our problem thus requires recognition that we start out with these unavoidable handicaps:

First, imprecision of objectives; second, restriction on implementation; third, the extra burden of positiveness.

Although the foregoing handicaps are unavoidable, there are very many courses of cold war action that we are not restricted from taking, should be taking, but, because of our generally fuzzy conception of what we are up against, we are not taking. For example:

CIVIL DEFENSE A COLD WAR WEAPON

Earlier the very substantial Soviet civil defense effort was mentioned. It was estimated to be sufficiently effective to enable them to reduce casualties by 80 percent in case the Soviet homeland suffers attack.

Thus Soviet civil defense constitutes a major dulling of the deterrence capability of our retaliatory bomber and missile strikeback forces. That is, it makes it less costly for the Soviets to initiate war and thus operates as a factor encouraging them to do so. This situation also presents monumental possibilities in connection with nuclear blackmail. This is adequately illustrated by hypothecating a full-scale Soviet civil defense evacuation timed in coordination with an "or else" ultimatum, taken in context of our

own daily 5 to 7 p.m. metropolitan area evacuation problems.

Civil defense is thus, in fact, a cold war weapon of equivalent value to say, the DEW line-Pinetree line warning systems and anti-missile missiles. But contrast our "bit-thinking" relative expenditures on civil defense in comparison to these warning systems. Moreover, civil defense is a moral type of action which is not denied to us. Failing to recognize its cold war possibilities, we have almost completely neglected it and given our challenger a decisive advantage on this rampart of the total conflict.

During the hearings in 1959 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy attempted to estimate the effect on the United States should we suffer a surprise nuclear attack totaling 1,500 megatons. It found that 60 million U.S. casualties would result—one-third of our population—48 million killed and 12 million injured. Yet, at the same hearings a Navy scientist testified that simple fallout shelters giving protection against nuclear radiation by a factor of 1,000 can be built at a cost of only \$100 per person. These would be sufficient, he estimated, to avoid two out of every three of the hypothecated casualties.

In short, for just 1 year's cost of the U.S. farm subsidy program, \$6 billion, shelters could be built that would prevent 40 million surprise attack casualties—avoid 32 million deaths and 8 million injuries. Coupled with workable evacuation procedures, this 66⅔ percent avoidance of casualty rate could well be upped to the 80-percent figure I have estimated for the U.S.S.R. civil defense program.

I leave you to your own speculation how far adrift in the sea of semantic disorder we are when we take civil defense to mean only what the dictionary may define the words to mean. I also leave to your speculation how great a part our reserve forces, marking time in almost every city and hamlet of our country, could play in our total effort vis-à-vis the international Communist threat if they were realistically put to work preparing an adequate U.S. civil defense effort.

A good deal of resistance to spending money on civil defense as well as some of the other necessary actions we must take for survival stems from those who argue that thermonuclear war is neither believable nor feasible, so basing any efforts on the possibility of it occurring are senseless. Resistance also comes for others who argue that such a war would be so terribly destructive that we should surrender rather than fight it. In short, they say, "it is better to be Red than dead." It is now my purpose to expose the fallacies of these arguments.

BELIEVABILITY OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR

We may quite agree that thermonuclear war is horrible to contemplate and that every intelligent effort should be made to avoid it. But it is feasible and unless we are willing to submit to nuclear blackmail and capitulate to the Communists, we must so regard it.

Within the recent past: First, the Rockefeller study concluded that the pos-

sibility of nuclear war must be faced. Second, hundreds of Russian military books and articles translated by the Pentagon all reveal the U.S.S.R. thinks in such terms as a matter of course. Third, a Johns Hopkins University study for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee warns that the United States is open to nuclear attack. Fourth, Congress appropriated almost \$45 billion for national defense, which included substantial amounts for maintaining our own nuclear arsenal operative.

FEASIBILITY OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR

Mathematician Herman Kahn recently completed a 2-year study for the Rand Corp. and concluded that thermonuclear war is feasible.

The facts and assumptions on which Dr. Kahn reached his decision were corroborated fully during our Joint Atomic Committee hearings last year which took several days' testimony from expert witnesses regarding the effect of a hypothecated nuclear attack on the United States followed by our nuclear retaliation against the attacker.

Briefly, the most pertinent thermonuclear war facts are these:

Genetic effects: An increase in children born seriously defective of about 25 percent from the current level of 4 per 100 of all births to 5 per 100. This is a large penalty since it would have to be paid through 30 to 40 generations. But it is far from annihilation.

Medical problems: Bone cancer, leukemia, and other life-shortening effects of internal and external radiation would amount to 1 to 2 years for lighter exposures and 5 to 10 years for heavier exposures. In any case, life will go on.

Economic recuperation: Assuming casualties in the 60 million range and semitotal physical destruction of the 53 standard metropolitan areas, expect full recuperation; that is, restoration of immediate preattack gross national product within 5 to 10 years. This is far from national suicide.

BETTER RED THAN DEAD?

Disposing of the depressingly cowardly and unrealistic "better Red than dead" philosophy requires us to get out of the rut of the 1,500 megaton, mass-destruction Hollywood movie script—congressional hearing's pattern for a moment and think about some other possibilities should the Communists really decide the day has come to push the button.

A wholly depopulated, totally destroyed United States would serve only one Communist purpose: Elimination of the opposite pole of a bipolar world and accomplish their one world, a Communist one, objective. But it would be done at the price of denying to them a number of things they could put to advantageous use. Recalling their attribute of whole thinking, we should at least contemplate other possibilities for action they may be considering in their strategic thoughts.

For instance, they could utilize the production of our machine tool factories, our steel furnaces, and certain of our other industrial capacities. All, of course, assuming selected trained slave

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labor survived to operate them. They do not need our oil or chemical production, for example, but they would be glad to dismantle the undamaged plants and haul them back for use in their own country as they did with so many German factories. I suppose quite an inventory could be made—and probably has been made in the Kremlin—along these lines.

HYPOTHECATED COMMUNIST ATTACK

Assuming so, the Soviet move might well be one calculated to induce surrender with the least possible material damage and personnel casualties, then to go about the business of mass murder and destruction on a selective basis afterward.

It might go something like this:

Strike terror with a few nuclear bombs—the horrors of nuclear war propaganda background already has been laid for that—but forego the all-out attack. Damage communication facilities as little as possible so that where panic is created, it can be communicated elsewhere and infect other parts of the country. Delve into the unknown, it is always more terrifying than the known. Strange, horrifying and morale cracking nerve gases might be released by infiltrated saboteurs and fifth columnists. Shockingly hideous physical and psychological illnesses might be induced by germ warfare. Avoid destruction of Washington, D.C., so a Government will exist to surrender as panic, terror, and hysteria mount in increasing crescendo to demand it.

Then follow with a military occupation to carry out what, for lack of a better name, I call selective genocide. Genocide is defined as the systematic extermination of whole racial, political, and cultural groups. Here we are dealing with such a systematic extermination as it applies to:

First. Occupational groups which do not contribute to the needs of the Communists;

Second. Nonproductive persons; and

Third. All persons philosophically hostile to the regime.

Selective genocide was carried out ruthlessly in Russia itself when the Communists seized power. It happened in China. It happened in Hungary. It is an accepted Communist power technique and would certainly be used if they took over here.

The pattern is all too clear. In the initial phases they send agents out to stir up resistance movements and march the nonconformists against prepositioned guns and tanks as they did in Budapest. That does a pretty complete, quick, and dirty job of getting rid of most potential antigovernment leadership. They dump the ill, the aged, the insane, all the military and like groups into concentration camps where starvation and disease soon eliminate them. Lawyers, ministers, teachers, farmers always go this way, too, when the Reds take over. No bankers, insurance men, advertising executives, newspapermen, or even file clerks would be required by the Red regime, so they would be exterminated, too. Scientists and engineers

could look forward to the same fate suffered by their German counterparts following World War II. Not many slave doctors would be needed either, to tend the few slave laborers left operating plants and facilities of value to the conqueror.

INDIVIDUAL'S SURVIVAL TEST UNDER COMMUNISM

This hypothecation of mass murder could go on and on. I think I have said enough as preface to the proposition that all you need to do to estimate your chance of survival if the Reds ever took over is honestly to answer the questions: Is what I think OK with the Communists? Is what I do any value in a Communist regime?

Think it over.

IF THE REDS TOOK OVER: U.S. CASUALTY ESTIMATES

I have tried estimates for this from population employment statistics, and when you include the family along with the employed person, which you must do, and count about 10 million deaths from the initial bombs, nerve gas, germ warfare, and the like, the total U.S. casualties start at a low of around 60 million and run as high as 100 million dead within 12 months following a Red takeover.

Americans have a personal stake in this thing all right—it is their lives. Even if the Communists took over without firing a shot, there still would not be a choice between being "Red" or "dead." The sooner we understand it the better. The price tag on surrender in terms of lives, freedom, and every other way is much greater than the price tag on fighting and winning the protracted conflict.

But, say some, there is a third alternative to fighting or surrender that is open to us and should be used. It is the alternative of negotiation. We should negotiate our differences with the Communists. It is true that ordinary negotiation is a third alternative. But only in instances where both sides are willing to negotiate, willing to forego some of their demands as a price for peaceful settlement, and willing to keep the promises made. Although Communists are willing to negotiate, they are seldom willing to negotiate at any cost which involves foregoing their ultimate goal of world domination. In fact, they have, since the beginning, pursued a calculated course of insincere negotiation wherever it would forward that goal. This is not to say that no negotiation at all is possible, but to warn that only is it possible in those limited cases where some factor in addition to good faith alone is present to compel Communists to keep their treaty promises.

TREATY VIOLATION

Summed up masterfully by the distinguished international lawyer, Adm. Chester Ward, the Communist philosophy on treaties is this:

Communist dogma insists that promises, like piecrust, are made to be broken. Whom the Communists would destroy, they first invite to coexist, and offer a nonaggression pact.

In its 40-year history, the Soviet Union has signed over 2,000 agreements with

non-Communist governments. It is safe to say that those remaining unbroken by the Kremlin are only those which expediency has not yet dictated the breaking.

Treaty violation, as practiced by the Communists, has two facets:

First. The conventional breach of existing treaties whenever, because of changed circumstances, they no longer serve its current purpose; and

Second. The more Machiavellian practice of deliberately seeking treaties involving immediate concessions by the non-Communist signatory in exchange for delayed Communist concessions which are subsequently avoided by formal or informal treaty violation at the time performance is called for.

Such Communist diplomatic perfidy is a regrettable fact of international life that cannot safely be ignored. It must be recognized as a dangerous pitfall in any and all negotiations between East and West. It must be accepted as a limitation on talks, conferences, and negotiations as a means toward achieving a stable world order, based on respect for, and conformity with, international law.

Realistically citing the demonstrated disregard by the Communists of their pledges as one of the greatest obstacles to success in substituting the rule of law for rule by force, former President Eisenhower declared a basic rule for Western self-preservation in his 1959 State of the Union message by saying:

We have learned the bitter lesson that international agreements, historically considered by us as sacred, are regarded in Communist doctrine and in practice to be mere scraps of paper. As a consequence, we can have no confidence in any treaty to which the Communists are a party, except where such a treaty provides within itself for self-enforcing mechanisms.

The inspection—self-enforcement procedures Eisenhower called for are necessary because the process of negotiation and agreement inherently involves concessions. Unless matched by equivalent Communist bloc concessions any Western concessions can represent only steps away from, not toward, the goal of successful conclusion of the protracted conflict for they would constitute a further whittling away of an already weakened Western position.

Equivalency, however, is not measured by the paper magnitude of mutual concessions. Concessions by the Soviet bloc must be self-enforcing upon them. Unless this is so, they will never be honored to the impediment of the advancement of international communism. The quid pro quo of the agreement's words is an illusion without this inherent safeguard. Without it, no agreement "relaxing tensions" as a "first step" toward peace, as the emotional agreement goes, is a step toward peace as the West understands it. It is a step toward peace as the Hungarian freedom fighters were savagely taught it.

INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCEPTS CONTRASTED

As the West understands it, the solemn observance of international obligations is the backbone of international law and underlies settlement of differences be-

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tween nations without resort to war. As the Communists understand it, the timely breach of international obligations is simply another expedient weapon in their protracted conflict arsenal, and international law is only a "shell game" for playing on a worldwide scale.

This is the basis of Stalin's observation regarding relations with non-Communist countries that:

Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron.

And from the standpoint of Western concepts of morality, it is the basis for the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee's evaluation:

You must be a liar, a cheat, and probably a spy before you can represent a Communist nation in international diplomacy. You must have no more regard for honor when you sign an agreement on behalf of your country than a forger does when he puts a name on a check.

Communist contempt for international law and decency is the theoretical and practical basis on which Red Army commissars, despite promise of safe conduct, arrested and executed the leaders of the Hungarian revolution while ostensibly negotiating an armistice.

NEGATORY PROPAGANDA

With the Hungarian example in mind, we reach a point where negatory propaganda can be defined and illustrated using the nuclear-test-ban issue as an example.

By negatory propaganda I seek to describe a technique aimed at negating use by your opponent of a device or weapon of value to him by propaganda aimed at creating such intense public opinion against its use, that it is in fact denied or negated.

BAN THE BOMB

For a period following 1945 the United States, only, possessed nuclear capacity. We had a weapon which could overcome the Communist bloc's great military superiority in terms of conventional arms and armaments. As a consequence, to deny us use of the weapon, and thus the superiority, the Kremlin and Red agents everywhere propagandized the world on the alleged horrors which would stem from use of the weapons. Many well-intentioned non-Communists became inadvertent allies of the Communists by taking up the ban-the-bomb hue and cry. The propaganda did, in fact, negate our use of nuclear weapons in Korea. This cost us dearly in both lives and effort.

But while feverishly denouncing nuclear weapons, the Soviets mounted a massive effort to achieve them. They did so by the early 1950's. This did not change their line or alter their efforts, however, because denial to the West of the use of nuclear weapons still is an obvious way to tilt the balance of power to their direction.

Their gigantic propaganda campaign raged on with consummate skill right up until the recent moment when it became more advantageous to them to torpedo the Geneva A-test ban talks and resume atmospheric testing than it was to keep the talks going and stall us from improv-

ing our own defensive weapons stockpile. Revelation to the world of their total hypocrisy by firing off a series of tests—obviously in long preparation under cloak of the Geneva talks—was a small price to pay for the advantages they gain thereby.

An obvious advantage is the jump it will give the Soviets over the West in nuclear weaponry. A less obvious, but perhaps greater, advantage calculated by Kremlin minds is nuclear blackmail in connection with the Berlin crisis. Coupled with the already high tensions generated by Berlin, "terror talk" of a 100-megaton super-bomb plus new fallout in the atmosphere is supposed to generate such hysteria in the world that concessions to the Reds will come out of negotiations over the issue.

Aside from the quite apparent fact that the only way to handle blackmail is to resist it and the only way to surmount a bluff is to call it, there is a more basic lesson we must learn from the 2½-year test-ban fiasco. It is: The moral issue is not the type of weapons which the free nations must stock in their arsenals to preserve freedom and the rich heritage of Western civilization. The issue is: The morality of stripping those arsenals, imperiling that civilization and relegating its millions of souls to mass murder or to the slavery of the communes.

Whether we surrender in one lump sum or are propagandized and blackmailed into it on the installment plan, the result is the same.

FREE WORLD PROPAGANDA

There are many who observe these Communist propaganda efforts, their successes, and say if only we spent more money on our own propaganda overseas they could be turned back. True, our efforts can and should be stepped up. But we must accept the fact that our own propaganda efforts cannot, in the short term at least, produce results as impressive as theirs simply because theirs is based on lies, exaggerations and deceptions rather than upon truth. Truth is by far the greater power, but by far the more difficult and time consuming to propagate. The standards of morality by which we must gage our actions limit us to the truth.

Further, as to areas behind the Iron Curtain, we are under additional handicaps to the transmission of information. First, the Iron Curtain blocks communication in both directions. Second, neither world public opinion nor internal public opinion is an appreciable factor in the decision-making process of the Communist masters. Third, even if you overcome physical barriers to communication with people behind the Iron Curtain, there is still a psychological barrier to surmount. It stems from the fact that most of the population has come to adulthood since communism took over. Large gaps in public understanding and knowledge exist which cannot be spanned by the kind of appeals effective with Western minds. Their policy of brainwashing from birth to death often has so twisted truth and history that counterappeals must be developed from that specialized frame of reference.

A personal illustration concerning this last statement: While in Russia in 1959 I attempted to discuss the brutalities committed by the Red army in Hungary. No Russian ever heard of them, nor would any believe what I said. Yet all would tell you for hours how the "brutal, beastial, U.S. Marines aggressed against the defenseless people of Lebanon at the behest of Wall Street millionaires." They also told me again and again that the United States was blocking a nuclear test ban treaty by demanding that it include inspection and enforcement procedures to insure compliance. "The U.S.S.R.," they told me with straight faces, "always lives up to its treaties."

SUBVERSION

Subversion is one of communism's most potent cold war techniques and is practiced all the time, everywhere. What we must keep in mind is that it is only one of many techniques, however. Nor is it even as potent a weapon for the Communists, within the United States, at least, as our own general lack of understanding of what they want and how they are going about getting it. I recently suggested that the President order a good course on "Communism and How To Fight It" prepared and taught to every person in Government from himself on down. Passing the course would be required before any Government employee could draw his paycheck. The course would also be available to the public generally. This step alone would obviate a necessity many have suggested for investigating the State Department or any other Department of Government—where in my belief ignorance is a hundred times more responsible for the inept conduct of our defense against communism than are subversion and disloyalty. This ruthless, resourceful, determined enemy cannot be combatted effectively unless Americans know its true identity and understand the way it fights.

LATIN AMERICA

The real danger from subversion is in less-developed areas, Latin America, for instance, where communism is attempting to leapfrog the Atlantic and take over countries both by infiltration of existing governments and by seizing control of liberal revolutionary movements. Each year hundreds of Latins receive revolutionary training in Moscow and are sent back to work ceaselessly to replace lawful government with regimes dominated and controlled by international communism. In connection with Cuba in particular and Latin America in general the following seven-point program is suggested:

First. Take a firm stand against Communist expansion, then tell and show the world we mean what we say—that the Monroe Doctrine is not dead.

Second. Declare the Western Hemisphere to be a peace zone, and tell the world we mean to keep it that way through use of national power, if necessary.

Third. Declare all Communist war material, including fuel, as contraband and prohibit its shipment into the peace zone.

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Fourth. Use national power to send back, jettison, or seize all contraband sent into the peace zone.

Fifth. Adopt as U.S. policy the ousting of Castro's Communist dictatorship from Cuba, and enlist active support from anti-Castro and anti-Communist forces in Latin America to help us get the job done.

Sixth. Develop and expedite a tailor-made information program for our hemisphere which makes it clear that we will not tolerate guerrilla invasions and power seizures of Latin American countries by Cuban or other Communist forces, or Communist expansion of any kind.

Seventh. Use our national power to the extent and in the manner required to free the Cuban people and give them the right of self-determination.

In order to implement the first four points mentioned above I have introduced House Joint Resolution 524, declaring Communist arms and munitions contraband in the Western Hemisphere and making provisions to enforce the same.

ORGANIZATION FOR HOT WAR

Our present military structure—Army, Navy, Air Force—coordinated at the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff level, represents an effective overall organization for waging hot war. Because of its effectiveness it actually deters hot war. Our military leaders are skilled and knowledgeable. They do the best possible job with the hardware and forces at their command.

I do not agree with Maj. Alexander de Seversky's contention that the services should be merged and overriding emphasis placed on airpower for delivery of massive nuclear destruction. That would limit us to a choice between nuclear holocaust and surrender—an inherently hopeless set of alternatives which would merely afford the "better Red than dead" propagandists more chance to spread their poison. With properly balanced military forces we can control and deter all-out nuclear war. Then, with proper organization for nonmilitary war—cold war—we can

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achieve victories instead of defeats in this area.

ORGANIZATION FOR COLD WAR

But, in contrast to our splendid organization for hot war, we are almost totally unorganized to wage and win cold war.

It would be madness to attempt to fight a military war without national strategy, without a top-level command, without war plans, without offenses and planned defenses, without mobilizing the national effort and without appealing to the patriotism of our people to work, to sacrifice, and to win. Yet, without any of these things, we are engaged in a new, strange, and deadly kind of war which we are not winning. It is our clear duty to establish the organization we need to fight this kind of war, to mobilize our people and our resources, and to embark on the long, difficult road toward victory.

This effort involves economics, diplomacy, intelligence, science, psychology—all the phases of human activity short of military operations between major powers. The effort required goes far beyond the State Department or any other department of Government—far beyond the formal government even—it sweeps across our whole society.

The President alone has the broad power and control over the wide range of functions which must be organized, carried on, timed, coordinated and pushed to overall success to meet the enemy and overcome it. At the top, with the President's daily attention, must be the national nerve center and command post. Call it the Strategic and Tactical Office of the President—STOP. Here at COMSTOP, in the White House itself, stopping communism must be a 24-hour-a-day operation for as long as it takes to win.

Here are just a few of the activities that must feed to and from COMSTOP:

National strategy and tactics, military and nonmilitary strategy and tactics, intelligence, political operations, diplomatic moves, labor and industrial mobilization, economic operations, finance, agricultural and commercial functions, covert and overt international opera-

tions, cover and deception, informational and cultural programs, ideological positions, psychological warfare, military liaison, posture evaluation and a host of others.

All these operations must be tied together constantly—orchestrated like a symphony. Each must be run by managers who are themselves knowledgeable in the political, strategic, and psychological nuances of nonmilitary war. Command of these activities requires as great a skill as military command. We must quickly train in our universities and elsewhere the knowledgeable Americans needed to officer and man this fourth force in our defense.

It should be reemphasized that COMSTOP must not only defend against actions the Soviets mount in what they regard as the war zone, but must, if we are ever to win, carry the fight into their peace zone. Within the Communist empire are countless areas of weakness and possible internal strife. Brig. Gen. David Sarnoff in urging former President Eisenhower to wage cold war and turn Moscow's own weapons against world communism said: "Our potential fifth column is greater by millions than the enemy's."

CONCLUSION

Concluding a discussion of this nature and extent by attempting a summary would be futile. I have given little more than a skeleton outline of the dangers we face and what we must do to surmount them. So I will reiterate only that we must constantly deter hot war by being capable of fighting and winning it, if necessary, and we must declare the nonmilitary war and mobilize all our physical and material resources to win it.

All this will take the highest and best our generation of Americans has to offer its country. Let us take faith from the courage and wisdom of the men who founded our country and made her great. If we, today, but possess equal courage and wisdom—and I firmly believe we do—there is no domestic problem we cannot solve nor foreign force we need ever fear.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

Attached is a proposed note for your signature to Craig Hosmer acknowledging his note to you enclosing a letter he wrote to the President which included his study on "Organization for Cold War." Copies of this have been sent to DD/P and DD/I for their thoughts on this but in the meantime it seemed appropriate to acknowledge Hosmer's sending this to you. Further, it may be difficult for meaningful substantive comment to be given which would be unclassified.

27 February 1962
(DATE)

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UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		INITIALS	DATE	
1	IG	7D59 3E04 Langley	LBK	27 Feb.	
2	DCI	3E14 Langley			
3					
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

To 1. I believe the subject matter is such that DD/P could not give a substantive comment which would be unclassified. Therefore suggest DCI simply acknowledge at this time.

OK LBK

FOLD HERE TO

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE
Legislative Counsel, 221 East		26 Feb 62

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Legis. Counsel		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: <div style="text-align: center; font-family: cursive; font-size: 1.2em;"> Suggest you get DDP to prepare a comment. L BK </div>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
LB Kirkpatrick			19 Feb 62
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

Memo from the desk of

CRAIG HOSMER, M. C.

2/17/62

Dear John —

This has implications
to the CIA —

Best regards
Craig